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Our study analyzes theories of learning for strategic interactions in networks. Participants played 
two of the 2 x 2 games used by Selten and Chmura (2008) and in the comment by Brunner, Camerer 
and Goeree (2009). Every participant played against four neighbors and could choose a different 
strategy against each of them. The games were played in two network structures: a lattice and a 
circle. We compare our results with the predictions of different theories (Nash equilibrium, quantal 
response equilibrium, action-sampling equilibrium, payoff-sampling equilibrium, and impulse 
balance equilibrium) and the experimental results of Selten and Chmura (2008). One result is that 
the majority of players choose the same strategy against each neighbor. As another result we 
observe an order of predictive success for the stationary concepts that is different from the order 
shown by Selten and Chmura. This result supports our view that learning in networks is different 
from learning in random matching. 
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1. Introduction 
In their 2008 paper, Reinhard Selten and Thorsten Chmura (henceforth SC) analyze a set of 12 
different 2 x 2 games. For 6 constant and 6 non-constant sum games they compare the predictive 
success of five stationary concepts. The five concepts compared are:  1. Nash equilibrium (Nash), 2. 
Quantal response equilibrium (QRE) (McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995), 3. Action-sampling equilibrium 
(ASE) (Selten and Chmura, 2008), 4. Payoff-sampling equilibrium (PSE) (Osborne and Rubinstein, 
1998), and 5. Impulse balance equilibrium (IBE) (Selten and Buchta, 1999, and Selten, Abbink, and 
Cox, 2005). Since these concepts are explained in detail in SC, we do not explain them here. In their 
study, the randomly matched participants played the games over 200 rounds, which allows an 
interpretation  of the concepts “... as stationary states of dynamic learning models” (SC, p. 940). In 
our study we put the focus on learning in networks.  
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We recall a point made often and in many situations, that learning occurs in social contexts. When 
analyzing learning in economic decision-making, most studies deal with repeated interactions 
between two or more randomly matched players. In real life, learning in networks seems to be more 
natural. In our study, we will analyze whether learning in networks is different from learning in an 
environment of random matching. The question of whether subjects actually mix strategies against 
their network partners is another topic to be investigated in this study. While in a random matching 
environment players can mix strategies over time, in a network they can mix strategies within one 
period by playing different strategies against their neighbors. Learning in network structures also 
occurs via indirect neighbors whose decisions also affect direct neighbors.2 
From our perspective, the predictions of the five concepts on strategy learning depend neither on 
the neighborhood nor on the network structure. Therefore, we change the neighborhood from 
random matching to a network structure to test the impact of this parameter. 
In our study, we design a neighborhood game in an exogenously fixed network, where the players 
cannot choose their neighbors but can choose different strategies against each of the exogenously 
given neighbors. We run two different games used by SC as baseline games in a network. The 
experimental results we present allow us to analyze on the one hand how network structures affect 
learning, and on the other hand how to control for the predictive success of different concepts of 
learning. 
Our analysis is guided by three key questions: 
1) Do the participants (actually) use mixed strategies?3 
2) Does the structure of the network affect learning in the games? 
3) Are the learning theories proposed by Selten and Chmura (2008) good predictors for the 
participants’ behavior in network games? 
Based on the games used by SC (a constant and a non-constant sum game), we construct 
neighborhood games, where each player has four direct neighbors. With respect to the idea that 
players have to decide how they interact with their partners and how they adjust their behavior over 
time, the participants in our experiment could choose different strategies for each neighbor. 
Guided by the findings of Berninghaus, Ehrhart, and Keser (2002), where the players’ behavior was 
affected by different network structures, we used two different structures: a lattice and a circle. 
We address our first key question by analyzing how often the players use the ability provided, to play 
different strategies against their neighbors (to mix strategies within one round).  
Comparing the participants’ behavior in the two different network structures, we answer our second 
key question. Additionally, comparing our observed results with those of SC, we want to provide 
evidence that learning in networks differs from learning in a random matching environment.  
To answer our third key question, we compare our experimental results with the predictions of the 
five learning concepts. The results of SC were revised in studies by Brunner, Camerer, and Goeree 
(2009) (henceforth BCG) and by Selten, Chmura, and Goerg (2010). To ensure that the results are 
comparable, we use the same statistical techniques as these studies to analyze our data. 
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 Aspects of network formation, and learning in networks have been the center of attention in many studies. 
See e.g. Bala and Goyal (2000), Jackson and Watts (2002), and Berninghaus and Vogt (2006).  
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 The use of the term "mixed strategies" is referred to the possibility that players choose a different strategy 
against each neighbor in one round. In other words, they mix their strategies within this round. 
[3] 
 
As one of our main results we show that learning in networks is different from learning in random 
matching. However, we find no significant difference between the two network structures. In line 
with this result, we observe an order of predictive success for the five concepts that differs from the 
order given by SC, which means that learning in networks has a significant impact on strategy 
formation.  
As another remarkable result, we find that the majority of players choose the same strategy against 
each neighbor, i.e. players do not really mix strategies. This holds for both network structures 
employed in our experiments. Moreover, the average number of players not mixing strategies is 
slightly higher in the circle network. 
2. Description of the experiment 
In our study we use two games (see Figure 1) taken from SC. The main reason we use these games is 
that they generate clearly distinct predictions for the five stationary learning concepts. Figure 2 
shows the theoretical predictions of these concepts.  
2.1. The baseline games 
We use two games, a constant and a non-constant sum game, as baseline games. As explained by SC, 
both games form a pair that is characterized by having the same best response structure.4  
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Figure 1: The constant and the non-constant sum game 
Because we want, on the one hand, to turn the focus to learning by analyzing the impact of different 
network structures, and on the other hand to refer to the results of SC and BCG, we took the games 
from SC and extended them to neighborhood games in different network structures. 
constant sum game 
 
Non-constant sum game 
 
Figure 2: Theoretical equilibria in the games 
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 One can find detailed descriptions of the five concepts and the determination of the equilibria in Selten and 
Chmura (2008) and in Brunner, Camerer and Goeree (2009). 
[4] 
 
2.2. The neighborhood games and network structures 
Following Berninghaus, Ehrhart, and Keser (2002), we ran the games in exogenously given fixed 
network structures where each player has four direct neighbors. To accomplish this, 16 players were 
allocated into two different network structures. The 2 x 2 games described in Section 2.1 represent 
the baseline games. Based on these games, the neighborhood game was constructed such that each 
player interacts with her four direct (local) neighbors. Suitably to our first key question, in our 
experiment each player could use a different strategy against each of her neighbors in each round.  
Since it is well known in the literature that network structures affect the players’ behavior in games 
(see e.g. Berninghaus, Ehrhart, and Keser (2002), Kirchkamp and Nagel (2007), and Cassar (2007)) we 
used two different structures. Guided by the findings of Berninghaus, Ehrhart, and Keser (2002) 
regarding the behavior of players in a coordination game, we used two different network structures: 
a lattice and a circle. Figure 3  provides a schematic illustration.  
Network structure 1 – a lattice 
 
Network structure 2 – a circle 
 
Figure 3: The two network structures 
It is obvious that in both structures each player interacts with four direct neighbors. The difference 
between the structures is given by the number of indirect neighbors on the level of indirect 
interactions.  
There might be more equilibria in the network game as we present in Figure 2. Since we want to 
compare the players’ behaviors in the two different network structures as well as with the 
experimental results of SC, we use the equilibria presented in Section 2.1 as benchmarks. 
 
Exemplary explanations of the interaction structures: 
In the Lattice, player 1 interacts directly with player 2 as her right, player 4 as her left, player 13 as 
her top, and player 5 as her bottom neighbor5. On the first level of indirect interactions, player 1 has 
six indirect neighbors (players 16, 14, 3, 8, 6, and 9). On the second level of indirect interactions, 
player 1 has four indirect neighbors (players 15, 7, 12, and 10), and one indirect neighbor (player 11) 
on the third level of indirect interactions. Behaviors  
In the Circle, player 1 interacts directly with player 8 and player 16 as her left neighbors and with 
player 2 and player 10 as her right neighbors. On the first level of indirect interactions player 1 has 
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 As one can see, players at the edges of the lattice have their neighbors on the opposite edges. 
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five indirect neighbors (players 9, 7, 15, 11, and 3). On the second level of indirect interactions, 
player 1 has four indirect neighbors (players 6, 14, 12, and 4), and she has two indirect neighbors 
(players 13 and 5) on the third level of indirect interactions. 
 
3. Experimental procedure 
In order to compare our results with the results of SC, we designed our experiment to be as similar as 
possible to theirs.  
We ran the experiments at the MaXLab, the experimental laboratory at the University of Magdeburg. 
For each neighborhood game, four sessions were conducted with 16 participants each. The 
participants were randomly matched, and they were told that the matching could change during the 
experiment—which did not, in fact, happen. We ran the games over 100 rounds. In each round the 
players could choose a different strategy against each neighbor. After each round the players were 
informed about the payoffs from each 2 x 2 game, i.e. about the total payoff from the last round and 
about the accumulated payoffs over all rounds.6  
The payoffs were presented by “points” which were converted into Euro at an exchange rate of four 
payoff points equaling 1 Eurocent. An experimental session lasted about 1 to 1.5 hours and the 
average earnings of a participant were about 10 Euro. The 256 participants in our experiment were 
recruited using ORSEE software (Greiner, 2004) from a pool of mostly students from various faculties. 
To program our experiments we used the experimental software Z-tree (Fischbacher, 2007). 
 
4. Experimental results 
To compare our experimental results with the theoretical predictions of the five concepts, and also 
with  the results of SC, in Table 1 we show the observed relative frequencies of playing Up (strategy 
“up” in the 2 x 2 games) and Left (strategy “left” in the 2 x 2 games), played in the two different 
network structures. 
constant sum game 
  Session 1 Session 2 Session 3 Session 4 Average Variance 
Lattice 
Up 0.032 0.053 0.061 0.045 0.048 0.000153 
Left 0.784 0.702 0.587 0.692 0.691 0.006529 
Circle 
Up 0.036 0.054 0.048 0.059 0.049 0.000098 
Left 0.779 0.683 0.756 0.641 0.715 0.004092 
Non-constant sum game 
  Session 1 Session 2 Session 3 Session 4 Average Variance 
Lattice 
Up 0.062 0.138 0.143 0.100 0.111 0.001425 
Left 0.677 0.764 0.795 0.741 0.744 0.002500 
Circle 
Up 0.115 0.107 0.110 0.051 0.096 0.000901 
Left 0.724 0.836 0.863 0.672 0.774 0.008223 
Table 1: The relative frequencies of playing Up and Left in the baseline games 
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 We provided the same feedback as the players received in the experiment of Selten and Chmura (2008).  
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Key question 1: Do the participants (actually) play mixed strategies? 
Unlike in other studies, the participants in our experiment could choose different strategies against 
each opponent in each period. Thus, the participants were able to mix their strategies within one 
round. As shown in Table 2, the participants did not use this opportunity very frequently. 
 
Average No. of players choosing the same strategy against each neighbor over 100 rounds 
 Lattice Circle 
constant sum game 81.03% 85.69% 
non-constant sum game 81.16% 86.22% 
Table 2: Average No. of players choosing the same strategy against each neighbor over 100 rounds 
The majority of players chose the same strategy for each neighbor. We do not find any difference in 
the strategy selection for the base games, but there are slight differences between the two different 
network structures. In terms of learning, or adjusting behavior, the results show that the frequency 
of choosing the same strategy against each neighbor increases over time (see Table 3).  
Average No. of players choosing the same strategy against each neighbor over rounds 1 -50 
 Lattice Circle 
constant sum game 78.34% 83.06% 
non-constant sum game 76.66% 83.09% 
Average No. of players choosing the same strategy against each neighbor over rounds 51 -
100 
 Lattice Circle 
constant sum game 83.72% 88.31% 
non-constant sum game 85.66% 89.34% 
Table 3: Average No. of players choosing the same strategy in the first fifty and in the second fifty rounds 
 
Result 1: Participants did not mix strategies within one round. 
 
Key question 2: Does the structure of the network affect learning in games? 
To find differences in learning between the Lattice network and the Circle network, we first analyze 
strategy selection in the baseline game. Based on the relative frequencies of playing U and L (see 
Table 1), we find no significant differences between the two network structures (sign test for any 
level of significance).  
We compare our observed results with the experimental results of SC to analyze if there are at least 
differences between networks as compared to random matching environments with respect to 




 Strategy choices – observed averages in: 
 Lattice network Circle network 
No network 
(Selten and Chmura) 
  constant sum game  
Up 0.048 0.049 0.079 
Left 0.691 0.751 0.690 
  non-constant sum game  
Up 0.111 0.096 0.141 
Left 0.744 0.774 0.564 
Table 4: The observed averages of playing Up and Left in games 
As one can see, our observed averages for both network structures are different from the results in 
the 2 x 2 games with only one randomly matched partner. The data in Figure 4 show that this is 
especially true for the non-constant sum game. These findings imply that learning in networks 
actually is different from learning in the 2 x 2 random matching environment used by SC. 
Constant sum game 
 
Non-constant sum game 
 
Figure 4: The observed averages of playing U and L in both games 
 
Result 2: We found no significant differences in the participants’ behavior in the two network 
structures. 
 
Key question 3: Are the learning theories brought up by Selten and Chmura (2008) good predictors for 
the participants’ behavior in network games? 
As we want to answer the question about the predictive success of the five concepts of learning in 
the context of learning in networks, we first illustrate the theoretical predictions of the five concepts 





Constant sum game 
 
Non-constant sum game 
 
Figure 5: Theoretical predictions of the five stationary concepts and the experimental results 
We use the corrected theoretical predictions of SC, according to BCG (2009). Table 5 shows the 
corresponding numerical predictions of the five stationary concepts. 
 Nash QRE ASE PSE IBE 
Observed average 
of Selten and 
Chmura 
Our observed 
average in the 
Lattice 
Our observed 
average in the 
Circle 
 constant sum game 
U 0.091 0.042 0.090 0.071 0.068 0.079 0.048 0.049 
L 0.909 0.637 0.705 0.643 0.580 0.690 0.691 0.751 
 non-constant sum game 
U 0.091 0.042 0.090 0.060 0.104 0.141 0.111 0.096 
L 0.909 0.637 0.705 0.691 0.634 0.564 0.744 0.774 
Table 5: The theoretical predictions of the five stationary concepts and the observed relative frequencies of 
U and L strategies 
To measure the predictive success of the stationary concepts, we analyze our data according to the 
method used by SC. The analysis is based on pairwise comparisons of the observed and the predicted 
relative frequencies.  Table 6 shows the mean squared distances and the sampling variance for both 
base games played in the two network structures. 





Lattice 0.054297 0.007988 0.006986 0.007880 0.017798 0.005011 
Circle 0.042619 0.009241 0.004899 0.008764 0.021652 0.003143 
non-const.  
sum game 
Lattice 0.030476 0.019173 0.004915 0.008355 0.015144 0.002943 
Circle 0.025158 0.028433 0.011603 0.016298 0.026441 0.006843 
Table 6: Mean squared distances of the five stationary concepts 
Based on the mean squared distances, it can be seen that there is an ordering of the concepts in 
terms of success: action-sampling equilibrium, payoff-sampling equilibrium, quantal response 
[9] 
 
equilibrium, impulse balance equilibrium, and Nash equilibrium. For the non-constant sum game, the 
impulse balance equilibrium performs slightly better than the quantal response equilibrium. 
Following the analyses in SC and in BCG, we test the results of all 16 independent observations 
together as well as separately for the constant and the non-constant sum game. Since the theoretical 
predictions are independent of the network structure, we test the results for both structures 
together. As in SC, we run the Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed rank test to compare the squared 
distances of the five concepts from the observed relative frequencies. In Table 7, we show the p-
values in favor of the various concepts. As per the remarks in BCG, we also perform the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov two-sample test to double-check the significance of the results (p-values are the numbers in 
brackets given in Table 7). 
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Table 7: p-values in favor of concepts, above: 16 independent observations together, middle: constant sum 
game (eight independent observations), below: non-constant sum game (eight independent observations) 
When comparing all independent observations, it is obvious that all non-Nash concepts do 
significantly better than Nash7. This holds for the constant sum game but not for the non-constant 
sum game. Moreover, we found no significant clear order of predictive success among the four non-
Nash concepts. 
 




In this paper, we analyzed learning in networks. Therefore, we added network structures to the 2 x 2 
games taken from Selten and Chmura (2008). Starting with two different games (a constant and a 
non-constant sum game) we construct a neighborhood game with two different network structures 
(a lattice and a circle), where each player has four direct (local) neighbors. Unlike in other studies, the 
participants in our experiment could choose a different strategy against each neighbor. 
As our study is related to that of SC, we compare our observed results to their experimental results, 
and to the theoretical predictions of five stationary concepts (Nash-equilibrium, quantal response 
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 That the non-Nash concepts outperform Nash is in line with the results of SC and BCG.  
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equilibrium, action-sampling equilibrium, payoff-sampling equilibrium, and impulse balance 
equilibrium). 
Guided by our key questions, we first analyze our data to check if the participants really play mixed 
strategies. Because the majority of players choose the same strategy against each neighbor, we 
conclude that the participants did not mix their strategies in a round. 
In a second step, we consider the influence of different network structures on the behavior of the 
participants. The differences between our results and the experimental results of SC provide 
evidence that learning in network differs from learning in 2 x 2 games with only one randomly 
matched partner. Unlike in other studies, we find no significant difference in the behavior of the 
participants in the two network structures we use. We find only slight differences in the number of 
participants choosing the same strategy against each neighbor. 
Concerning our third key question, we show that none of the five stationary concepts provides an 
exact prediction for the participants’ behavior in our experiment. We show that all non-Nash 
concepts outperform the Nash concept. The order of predictive success of the four non-Nash 
concepts is different for the constant sum and the non-constant sum game. It is perhaps notable that 
action-sampling equilibrium and payoff-sampling equilibrium strategies do better than impulse 
balance equilibrium when both games are combined. Aside from this, there is no clear ranking 
among these four concepts. 
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